The Zionist entity since its formation has projected its military strength with the myth of invincibility. These multiple myths have been projected and propagated to subdue the ummah into submitting to its legitimacy. Many of these very myths have not only been actively expressed by the Zionists, but have been given life by the actions of various treacherous two-faced Muslim rulers. The article focuses on the reality of the Zionist’s military machine and compares this with the military capabilities of the surrounding Muslim countries.
The Zionist entity is in origin an artificial construct that the colonial powers inserted into the region. From 1900 until its creation in 1947, Zionists from Europe migrated in large numbers to Palestine. They proceeded to steal land from the inhabitants and expel them in order to found their illegal entity. This criminal history remains central to the Zionist’s security dilemma today. Its artificial nature means the Zionist entity suffers from significant geographic, economic, demographic and technological challenges that are permanent and unresolvable.
The most significant of these challenges is the entity’s lack of strategic depth. The country has less than 13,000 square miles of land, which makes it smaller than Wales. At its narrowest, the Zionist entity is a mere 6 miles wide. A hostile fighter could fly across its widest point (40 nautical miles wide from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea) in under four minutes. For these reasons, the Zionist entity has a densely packed population.
The Zionist entity is small in terms of its demography. Its population is about 8.5 million people. In comparison, there were 22 million people in Syria (pre-war) and nearly 100 million in Egypt. Put another way, the Zionist entity’s 8.5 million people are surrounded by 427 million Muslims. This means the Zionist entity is unable to field a large army compared to others in the region, due to its small population, so it must rely on its reserves. This small population size also increases its sensitivity to civilian and military losses. Losing just one war could mean the end of the country. Thus ever since 1948, this fragile entity has faced an existential threat of survival from the surrounding states as well as non-state actors. The basic challenge for the Zionist entity is that its security requirements outstrip its military capabilities, making it continuously and permanently dependent on an outside power.
The challenge this creates for the Zionist entity was outlined by George Friedman from Stratfor: “The center of gravity of “Israel’s” strategic challenge was always Egypt. The largest Arab country, with about 80 million people, Egypt could field the most substantial army. More to the point, Egypt could absorb casualties at a far higher rate than “Israel”. The danger that the Egyptian army posed was that it could close with the “Israelis” and engage in extended, high-intensity combat that would break the back of “Israel” Defense Forces by imposing a rate of attrition that “Israel” could not sustain. If “Israel” were to be simultaneously engaged with Syria, dividing its forces and its logistical capabilities, it could run out of troops long before Egypt, even if Egypt were absorbing far more casualties.”
Being a small country with little flexibility in the use of land as a buffer zone, a limited capacity to take large numbers of military or civilian casualties, and economic and social constraints, a quick end to any major war is essential for the Zionists and this has dominated its military doctrine. On its inception, the Zionists faced the threat of extinction at the hands of massed Arab armies, that if working in concert, would overwhelm it in an invasion. This is why the Zionists military doctrine has always been to maintain what they have and expand to gain as much of the surrounding lands. This meant having a mobile force in conjunction with the air force in undertaking unilateral attacks.
This led to the birth of the entity’s offensive approach, with a posture that called for transferring the fight to enemy territory, delivering pre-emptive strikes, attaining a quick victory by concentrating the offensive on a single front while defending other fronts, and enhancing the ability to rapidly shift the main effort from one front to another. This led to large investment in the air force as its main military firepower. In 1953, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion laid this out: “Dominance in the air, more than any other factor, will ensure us victory, and vice versa.” The entity’s air force remains today its most advanced military arm.
With a possible war with multiple Arab armies, the Zionist entity’s doctrine sought to balance its quantitative weakness with technologically superior arms to its Arab neighbours. Through help from the West, the Zionist entity was able to develop a combat aircraft, navy vessels, ammunition, small arms, missiles and electronics. The Zionist entity was convinced it must maintain a Qualitative Military Edge (QME) over its Arab neighbours — the concept that it must rely on superior equipment and training to compensate for its smaller population and recruitment base relative to the Arab states.
The small population had a knock-on effect on its economy of producing a labour shortage. The Zionist entity only has a labour force of 3.3 million. Economic development and industrial development are labour intensive and dependent on knowledge and skills retention. With such a small labour force the Zionist entity is reliant upon foreign knowledge and expertise.
The Zionist entity’s economy is worth $387 billion, this is just too small to cater for the entity’s population. This impacts how much taxes the government collects as it subsidises the world’s Jews to migrate to the entity to normalise its occupation. As a result, the entity has focused on key industries for its survival. This means many industries such as mining and manufacturing have been neglected. To compensate for this the entity relies on technology, military aid and foreign aid transfers. It also relies on influential Jews across the world, especially in the US to influence foreign policies of these states in favour of it. The Zionist entity has a heavy dependency on the cooperation of other states as self-sufficiency is not an option.
The Zionist entity has a large energy deficit, meaning it will always have to import energy. The entity relies heavily on external imports for meeting most of its energy needs, spending significant amounts from its domestic budget for its transportation sector which relies on gasoline and diesel fuel, while most of its electricity production is generated using imported coal.
Rather than being a military giant, this weak entity has always been vulnerable to its neighbours. However, it received a massive security boost from the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. The Zionist entity then had a freer hand to focus on non-state actors and felt able to accelerate settlement building, increase expulsions of the Palestinians from their lands and expanding its economic activity.
In the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the various Palestinian intifadas and the wars with Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in Gaza in 2008, Zionist interests were damaged, but its survival was not in question. Neither Hizbullah nor Hamas possess large armoured formations, nor do they have the potential to invade or overrun well-defended Zionist positions.
Today, the Zionist entity’s doctrine is completely geared towards asymmetric warfare. This consists of asymmetric warfare in an urban setting, in which the army deliberately targets civilian infrastructure, as a means of inducing suffering for the civilian population.
Its defence industry has been constructed to deal with its precarious situation. As it has an extremely small population, too small for the government to collect sufficient taxes to fund a large industrial base. This means investment in major military platforms is prohibitively expensive because of the huge investment required to keep a leading position in those areas. The Zionist entity is also limited in purchasing platforms from abroad, due to costs, even though it has consistently found foreign patrons to its cause, politicians from its inception have found that defence sales have come with strings attached.
The Zionist entity faces a precarious military reality, which no amount of military development can change. Despite receiving significant US funds and military equipment it has failed to change the fact that it is outnumbered and surrounded. Armed militias have been able to expose the Zionist’s weakness on numerous occasions – even as the surrounding lands have large conventional armies sitting on the sidelines as spectators. The Zionists’ attempts at developing indigenous platforms have failed on most occasions as it lacks the economy to sustain such large projects. This is why it has come to rely on US handouts.
The Zionists entity’s aggressive military posture is really a public relations action to deter and confuse those who might wonder why the Arab and Muslim rulers do nothing to liberate Palestine. The rulers themselves are happy to fuel this story of the invincible and dangerous as it justifies their betrayal, cowardice and inaction. The Zionist entity lacks the strategic depth for a long intensity battle and aside from its air force has little power projection capabilities. The Zionist’s endless struggle will remain in trying to maintain a qualitative advantage over its neighbours, something its economy does not have the capacity to sustain.
Until the 1967 war with the Zionist entity, Egypt’s military doctrine was centred on securing Egypt’s key territories. Army formations were divided into four regional commands – the Suez, Sinai, Nile Delta, and Nile Valley up to Sudan. The remainder of Egypt’s territory, over 75%, was the sole responsibility of the small frontier Corps. Internal control was the priority for Nasser, leaving the coastal defence to a small frontier force.
After the 1967 humiliation, the army was reorganised, and a reorientation took place in Egypt’s military posture. Two further field armies were organised from the existing ground forces – the Second Army and the Third Army, both of which were stationed in the eastern part of the country.
The Egyptian war doctrine, derived from Britain, was not suited to the battle problem the Zionist entity posed. In 1967, the Zionist entity was considered to have won its most complete victory over Egypt, as well as Jordan and Syria.
After the 1967 war and throughout the 1970’s Soviet arms flowed into Egypt which also led to the restructuring of the Egyptian army which for decades had been designed almost wholly for controlling the population, not facing the enemies of the Ummah. The new military posture led to the shock invasion of the Zionist entity in the 1973 war, where the Zionists were caught completely off guard. While ground forces and senior officers wanted to press their advantage in a winning position, Anwar Sadat was only interested in finding a way to pursue peace negotiations and thus failed to push home the advantage gained from the territories recaptured. In 1979 the Zionist-Egypt peace deal was signed, which normalised relations between the two countries, eventually leading to the Zionists to withdrawal from the Sinai, leaving it as a demilitarized zone.
The Egyptian army has a force of 468,500 active personnel, with reserves of 479,000. It is a land-centric army, with the ground forces overwhelmingly dominating the whole force. The army formations consist of 3 field army units spread over 9 military bases consisting of armour, artillery and mechanized units.
Egypt’s 4,145 tanks are composed of 1,130 tanks are the US M1 Abrams tank. These have undergone several upgrades, including, new engines, extensive armour addition, armoured side skirts, fire control system with ballistics computers, infrared vision device, laser rangefinder and upgraded gun stabiliser. Egypt has produced the M1 Abrams tank on licence from the US.
The large size of Egypt’s ground forces has always concerned many western policymakers. It is considered massively disproportionate. Shana Marshall of the Institute of Middle East Studies at George Washington University highlighted: “There’s no conceivable scenario in which they’d need all those tanks short of an alien invasion.”
Egypt’s combat aircrafts are dominated by 240 US F-16s, and 76 French Mirages. In 1962 Egypt undertook a major program with the help of West German technicians to design and build a supersonic jet fighter, but the government terminated the project because of financial strains caused by the 1967 Six-day war.
Egypt’s forces are considered the strongest when measured relatively to the nations of Africa and the Middle East. The Egyptian military on its own is considered the tenth strongest in the world according to some estimates, and if used for offensive purposes it would be a force to be reckoned with. Today, however, the immense potential of the armed forces is shackled to a blinkered leadership under Sisi and his cronies, which has no vision, ambition or principles, let alone the capacity to understand how the Muslim lands could be liberated and transformed by the system of Islam.
Turkey’s military doctrine for long was structured to meet the enemy at its border and fight a structured retreat from the frontier. This picture did not change until the early 1990s. Until then the Turkish military ranked Russia, Greece, Iraq, Iran, and Syria as the top threats to security based on their perceived claims on Turkish territory and ability to project conventional forces. Until the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1990, the Turkish Army had a static defence mission of countering any possible attack on Thrace by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces and any attack from the Soviet Transcaucasus Military District on the Caucasus frontier.
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, this lead to a rethink within the army regarding its posture and the capability of the armed forces. Turkey lacked an indigenous defence industry and was still using outdated equipment. Military planners envisioned a land force anchored by heavy armour and mechanized infantry that could move quickly by road or across open country with organic air defence. In place of static defence relying on overwhelming numbers of older weapon systems, Turkish officers decided to create a highly mobile manoeuvre force. The air force and navy were to play a secondary and supporting role in this military strategy. The new doctrine also introduced Turkey’s military modernisation programme, which is now into its second decade where Turkey gradually moves to developing indigenous military platforms.
The Turkish armed forces consist of over 1 million personnel, including 378,000 reservists. The Armed forces consist of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and naval infantry) and the Air Force. The Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard, both have law enforcement and military functions. Turkey’s ground force of 402,000 personnel, is the largest portion of the armed forces.
Military planners have made significant strides in their National Tank Production Project (MİTÜP – Milli Tank Üretimi Projesi), an initiative developed in mid-1990’s to establish production, development and maintenance of main battle tanks. The project was initiated with an agreement signed between Otokar and Undersecretariat for Defense Industries in 2007, worth approximately $500 million in order to design, develop and produce 4 prototypes of the Main Battle Tank, using only Turkish resources. Otokar produced its first prototype in 2009 and from 3 July to 10 July 2013 the ‘Altay’ completed testing. Over the next decade, Turkey’s 3000 (approx) tanks will be replaced by the indigenously built third generation Altay.
Turkey’s air force consists of modern combat fighters dominated by the F-16, supplemented by 152 F-4 Phantoms. The Turkish air force trains intensively with US and NATO instructors on F-16 operations. It is now competent enough to train other air forces, such as those of Chile and the UAE, in those same F-16 operations.
Turkey continues to assemble F-16s under licence, it, however, has plans for the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) to reduce dependence on US-produced fighter jets. In 2010 SSM provided TAI with $20 million, to design a new fighter aircraft, which TAI might then develop and produce in partnership with a foreign company by 2020.
In 2010, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) presented the first medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) produced by a Turkish company. It is likely to be acquired not only by the Turkish Air Force but also by the Army and Navy, which altogether currently employ more than 200 MALE and Mini-UAVs.
Turkey’s most ambitious and most expensive development program, the TFX is a Fifth-Generation stealth Fighter, expected to begin its test flights in 2023 the TFX is a next-generation fighter program in cooperation with Sweden’s Saab and designed to replace Turkey’s fleet of F-16C/Ds starting in the 2020s.
Turkey currently has around 111 commissioned ships in the navy (excluding minor auxiliary vessels). This makes Turkey navy the most powerful fleet in the Middle East and North Africa.
Turkey’s armed forces are dominated by a land-centric structure, which gives it significant offensive capabilities. It is not now transitioning to a more mobile force and moving away from static structures. In line with its regional role, its army will only grow in capabilities. Turkey possesses immense resources, which must be directed towards the Ummah’s enemies, and tackling the security crises and occupied regions of the Islamic lands. Instead of this vaunted and noble role, the Turkish military under the leadership of Erdogan is carrying out the dirty work of the US administration, aggravating the region’s instability instead of ending it.
The basis of Iran’s current military doctrine was developed during the long Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Concepts such as self-reliance, holy defence and export of the revolution first entered the military lexicon during the Iran-Iraq War and were codified as doctrine in the early 1990s. These ideas mingled with concepts from pre-revolutionary doctrine, which was heavily influenced by the US, to form a unique hybrid that distinguished modern Iranian military doctrine from its largely Soviet-inspired counterparts in the Arab world.
With an effective embargo on military sales, Iran’s armed forces were tailored with war-fighting strategies to counter technologically superior adversaries. Tacitly acknowledging it has little chance of winning a conventional force-on-force conflict, Iran opted for a deterrence-based model of attrition warfare that raises an opponent’s risks and costs, rather than reducing its own.
Iran compensated for its inability to modernise its conventional forces, delays in its military production efforts, and limits on its arms by building up different kinds of military force.
Central to this has been the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which comprises around 125,000 men. Being a small force and not restricted to conventional army formations, the IRGC is Iran’s main weapon in its region. Its importance can also be seen from the fact the IRGC air force operates Iran’s ballistic missile forces.
Iran’s military strategy rests on a number of assumptions, it assumes state-on-state warfare is an impossibility, which is the Achilles heel of any asymmetric strategy. Due to this strategy, Iran has neglected and struggled to modernise its conventional forces. The costs involved are too high for Iran’s economy and budget to bear and as a result, investment has all been in its asymmetric capabilities.
Iran is reliant upon its missiles and irregular forces to provide defence from any foreign threat. Its conventional forces are poorly trained and poorly equipped and it is qualitatively outmatched by its irregular forces. However, having advanced irregular forces does give Iran some useful advantages.
With a smaller irregular force, Iran can deploy troops much more quickly as deployments will be smaller and not mechanised. This will give it a significant advantage over any adversary who will have to deploy large forces, with much more heavier equipment, which will delay any intervention.
Irregular forces are also cheaper to maintain as they make use of lighter weapons and technology. Unlike the US army, the Iranian forces do not require complex exercises to maintain readiness. Given that Iranian patrol boats, warships, and submarines are in position to fire their weapons as soon as they get underway from their home ports, the asymmetric maritime warfare model of Iran assumes that any maritime conflict will be fought at close range, without complex interdependent positioning of ships beforehand. Numbers and speed will be of greater importance in this context than advanced training.
Because Iranian maritime strategy does not require long-range deployments or complex, simultaneous ship movements at sea, Iranian naval exercises are focused on exercising basic capabilities, ensuring that if the conventional navy and IRGC navy need to fight, they can execute their short-range, short-duration, and technologically simple asymmetric warfare tactics capably. The conventional navy and IRGC navy are nowhere near as capable at traditional maritime combat as the US Navy, but they do not need to be; they only need to be capable of reliably exercising simple asymmetric tactics.
Iran’s most successful military development has been in the realm of missiles. In 1991 Iran announced the first domestic production of ballistic missiles. Iran’s inability to modernise its airpower has meant its air defence is weak, due to this Iran built up its strategic missile forces as a cost-effective way to compensate for its weaknesses.
The Iranian leadership has stated that it operates several thousand short and medium-range mobile ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-3 with a range of up to 2,100 kilometres. The Iranian military industry started the missile development program in earnest during Iran’s long and costly fratricidal war with Iraq. Throughout the war, Iran found that it could not strike certain Iraqi facilities or targets with its own forces. This resulted in an ambitious missile development programme that is still continuing. Today, Iran is developing space launch vehicles and sophisticated medium-range ballistic missiles. Iran’s ballistic missiles possess the capability to deliver a variety of conventional high explosives in its region and beyond.
The Shahab series of missiles are an indigenous design derived from the basic Scud. Nowadays the Shahab is accurate enough to hit specific large-area targets such as airports or port facilities and has a big enough payload to cause significant damage. There are a number of derivative designs of the Shahab series, including the Qiam 1 and the Ghadr-110, but for all practical purposes, these can be considered part of the Shahab series of missiles. The Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 are essentially updated Scud missiles and are classified as Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM), but the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 are much more capable versions and represent a significant improvement in range, payload, and accuracy. The Shahab-3 was the first Medium Range Ballistic missiles (MRBM) in the Iranian inventory. The Shahab-4, which is still under development, will have an increased range of 2000 kilometres.
The Sejil series of missiles are a derivative upgrade of the Shahab series of missiles with some important technological improvements. The most consequential feature of the Sejil series of missiles is that they are powered with solid fuel, giving them a significant operational advantage over the standard liquid-fuelled Shahab. Because solid-fuelled missiles are ready-fuelled, they do not need a separate liquid fuelling process. Therefore, solid-fuelled missiles have a much shorter launch cycle than liquid-fuelled missiles. In terms of range, the baseline Sejil is roughly comparable to the Shahab-4 and is classified as a Medium Range Ballistic Missile. In terms of operational effectiveness, it is significantly more lethal, as it has a shorter shoot cycle and is faster, giving missile defences less time to react. The Sejil purportedly incorporates two stages and solid fuel — both of which are significant steps in Iran’s missile program. Iran claims that it has a range of 1,200 km and significantly improved accuracy. In a similar situation to Turkey, despite the anti-Zionist rhetoric of its rulers, the military capacity of Iran is directed at dividing the Ummah and dancing to the tune of the Colonialists, rather than ending the occupation of Palestine.
Saudi Arabia was for long the world’s largest purchaser of global arms and America’s biggest customer. Saudi Arabia has – for the last decade and more – been one of the world’s biggest importers of arms. Whilst Saudi Arabia produces very little military equipment it has used the Ummah’s oil and gas resources to arm itself with the world’s most sophisticated and latest weaponry. Whilst much of this keeps foreign workers employed, Saudi actions globally do not reflect this position.
The current weapons inventory includes the latest battle tanks (the M–1A2 Abrams and 290 AMX–30), over 300 jets including the newly acquired Eurofighter Typhoons and upgraded Tornado IDS, F-15 Eagle and F-15E Strike Eagle fighter planes. It would surprise many to learn that Saudi military strength and technology is a match for many European nations and is superior to the Zionist entity in many areas.
Put within the context of this wealth of military riches, the inability of the Saudi regime to provide any protection to Muslims in recent crises is nothing short of criminal.
In conclusion, despite the myths and the rhetoric, the Zionist entity faces many hurdles in surviving in a region where it is completely outnumbered and outgunned. In any serious skirmish, its survival would be in question. In every area where the Zionist entity lacks capabilities, the surrounding nations have an abundance.
The biggest advantage the surrounding Muslim armies have large ground forces. In any war to liberate Palestine ground forces will be needed to conduct offensive operations and hold territory and deny it to its adversary. The Egypt military on its own can saturate the theatre of war against the Zionist entity, but in combination with other surrounding nations, the Zionist entity would be completely overstretched. As the battle would be over an area the size of Wales this is a very small area to conquer.
Turkey’s navy is more than capable of sealing the Zionist entities ports and the border with the Mediterranean. With Egypt moving its forces in the South and artillery strikes by Turkey form the West, this will be too many fronts for the Zionist entity to handle.
The Zionists have focused on air force in order to project power, but they face a strategic problem in this area, despite possessing some advanced jets. The challenge is that they are outnumbered considerably by the number of jets in the Islamic lands. If it has to face multiple armies then it will struggle to concentrate its forces to overpower or bring any power to bear.
The Zionists have received much help with developing missile defences. But these have never been tested against the missiles of Iran, Turkey or Egypt. In any war, it would not possible for the Zionist entity to deal with so many different targets.
The question for the Muslim armies is not whether they have the capability to deal with the Zionist entity. Rather it is when will they end their shameful inaction while their brothers and sisters face atrocities, expulsion and humiliation at the hands of an enemy who is encouraged by the silence of the treacherous Muslim rulers.
 Israel’s soaring population: Promised Land running out of room? Reuters, September 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-demographics/israels-soaring-population-promised-land-running-out-of-room-idUSKCN0RP0Z820150925
 Egypt, Israel and a Strategic Reconsideration, Stratfor, February 2011, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/egypt-israel-and-strategic-reconsideration
 See, http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=472&ArticleID=912
 Egypt may not need fighter jets but US keeps sending them anyway, NPR.org, August 2008, http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/08/08/209878158/egypt-may-not-need-fighter-jets-but-u-s-keeps-sending-them-anyway